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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CARL N. SMITH and,
DAWNA LaVERNE SMITH,

;
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

)

Case No. 880661-CA

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs .
)
LINMAR ENERGY CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation,

]

Defendant/Respondent.

)

Priority 14b

JURISDICTION
This Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear thxb
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated

78-2a-3{2)(j), (Supp.

1988) which permits appeals transferred to the Court of Appeals
from the Supreme Court.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a final Judgment of the District Court
of Duchesne County, Honorable Dennis L. Draney presiding,
determining the nature and amount of damages awarded to
plaintiffs based on defendants placement of an oil well, battery,
storage tank and road on plaintiffs' property pursuant to an oil
and gas lease.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court properly determine that defendants

choice of the well site was reasonable and practical and that the
dealings of defendant with plaintiff were carried out in good
faith?
2.

Did the trial court properly determine the nature and

amount of damages awarded to plaintiffs based on defendants
placement of a well site and road on defendants property?
3.

Did the trial court properly determine not to allow

plaintiff prejudgment interest?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
There are no constitution provisions, statutes or rules
which govern this case*
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the fall of 1984, plaintiffs filed an action in the
District Court of Duchesne County seeking damages against
defendant for entering upon plaintiffs' property and constructed
a well site and access road.

The case was tried without a jury

before the Honorable Dennis L. Draney on April 5 and 6, 1988.
After submission of written post-trial memorandums, the
court issued its Ruling dated June 8, 1988, awarding plaintiffs
damages of $16,065.00.

In making this determination, the Court

determined that plaintiffs were not entitled to damages on their
theory of eminent domain, but were entitled to be compensated for
damage to crops on the property used by defendant.

The Court

determined defendant's use of the 4.76 acre parcel in question
was of such nature and duration that it was rendered unusable for
agricultural purposes in the foreseeable future.

The Court ruled

the extent of damage to crops constituted virtually a total
taking of the property used by defendant and to allow plaintiffs
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only the minimal value of the crops grown for an unknown number
of years would not be equitable.

The value of such taking was

determined by the Court to be the fair market value of the
property after deducting the residual value to the landowner
after defendant's use of the property is terminated and the
property is restored.

In this regard, the Court arrived ai a

property value of $3,750.00 per acre with an offset of $375.00
per acre for its residual value.
The Court declined to allow plaintiffs damages based on a
fair market value of the subject property for residential
purposes, declined to award plainriffs severance damages, and
determined that defendant's choice of the well site was
"reasonable and practical" and that defendant acted in "good
faith".
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiffs are the owners of a 20 acre tract of land located
adjacent to the city limits of Altamont in Duchesne County, which
property is described as follows:
The East 1/2 of the Northwest 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4
of Section 25, Township 1 South, Range 4 West, USM.
Plaintiffs' property is located in the Altamont-Bluebell
oil field and is surrounded by numerous oil wells, six cf
which can be seen from plaintiffs' property (R. at 608-510, 712715) .
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Defendant is the successor lessee under an Oil and Gas Lease
covering the subject property which is dated March 29, 1966, and
was duly recorded in rhe office of the Duchesne County Recorder
(R. at 611-612).
During the month of August, 1983, defendant entered upon
plaintiffs' 20 acre tract and placed in the southwest corner an
oil well, oil well battery and storage tanks.

An access road

from the county road on the north to the well site was also
constructed.

Defendant's total occupancy consisted of 4.76 acres

vhich is hereinafter referred to as the "Well Site" (R. at 198201) .
Plaintiffs' 20 acre tract, including the well site, has been
used exclusively for agricultural purposes.

At the time of

defendant's entry, the property was leased to Ken Miller for
$450.00 per year.

This lease continued through the date of trial

at the same $450.00 per year lease price without offset due to
defendant's use of the well site (R. 632-634).
Defendant was restricted as to where it could locate its
well site because of spacing restrictions of the Utah Division of
Cil, Gas and Mining (R.at 181). Defendant considered several
other locations for the drill site but rejected the other sites
based on geological and economic factors (R. at 191). The school
property was rejected because a pond is located on the same; the
property is wet and the access road would have to be constructed
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on swampy ground (R. at 184, 185 & 189). The Wall property was
rejected because defendant did not want to deal with two property
owners and the property was wet which would result in higher
construction costs (R. at 186-187, 193). The Taylor site was
rejected because it was too far east geologically to achieve
defendant's objectives

(R. at 289).

Prior to construction of the well site defendant's agent,
Edward Whicker, contacted plaintiff Carl Smith and met him on the
subject property (R. at 227). As set forth in the following
testimony by Mr. Whicker, Carl Smith refused to provide any input
regarding where he would like the well drilled or the road
constructed:
Q .... You didn't say, how will this affect your use cf
the surface, Mr. Smith, did you?
A

Yes.

I asked him that.

Q

Oh, did you?

A

Yes.

Q

And did he say where he would have preferred to have it?

A

Yes.

He said he didn't want it on his property at ail,

Q Didn't he also tell you if you were going to do it he
would rather you put it to the east rather than to the west
side?
A I don't have any record of that or any recollection of
it. I asked him for an opinion as to where he would like
it, and he said he would not make a decision.
Q

He said he wouldn't tell you where to put it?

A I asked him if he would — he talked about subdividing,
and I asked him if he would like a road put somewhere else
so it would enhance his subdivision.
-5-

Q And you tell me -- he said he wouldn't give you an answer
to either of those questions?
A

That's right.

(R. at 192, 193).

Defendant contracted the size of the well site in 1985 after
the well was drilled and re-located the fence back to the west
reducing the drill site by 1.39 acres (R. at 629). The lessee of
the subject property, Ken Miller, was hired to restore the 1.39
acres by fertilizing and replanting at defendant's expense (R. at
643-644, 709-710).

The Court determined that despite good-fairh

efforts by defendant, the 1.39 acre tract was not restored and
plaintiffs damages with respect thereto continued (R.151).
Royalty payments have been made to plaintiffs and other
mineral owners in Section 25 resulting from the well drilled on
plaintiffs' property as well as from a well drilled on adjacent:
lands (R. at 255, 628, 652-653).
Plaintiff Carl Smith testified that he wanted to subdivide
the subject property.

However, Mr. Smith did not know whether

the property was located in Duchesne County or Altamont City and
was unaware of the subdivision requirements for either entity,
In addition, Mr. Smith had never obtained estimates of the costs
of subdividing the property

(R. at 636). Further, Duchesne

County had placed a moratorium on subdivisions at the time
defendant moved onto the well site (R. at 636-637).
Defendant's use of the property is not perpetual.

Ed

Whicker testified that in his opinion the well would be plugged

-6-

and the ground restored to its original condition in 1996 (R. at
242-243, 275).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
Plaintiffs' property is subject to an Oil and Gas Lease
giving defendant the right to enter on plaintiffs' property to
construct a well site for production of oil and gas. After a
review of the potential sites, it was determined that for
geological and economic reasons the site selected on plaintiffs'
property was the optimum site.
Defendant's representative, Edward Wicker, met with
plaintiff Carl Smith to explain why the well site was selectsd in
the proposed location and to receive information from Mr. Smith
relative to placement of the well site and access road.

Mr.

Smith's only position was that he did not want the well or road
anywhere on his property and refused to discuss options involving
his property.
The Oil and Gas Lease provided that defendant shall pay "for
damage caused by its operations to growing crops".

The Court

determined that to allow plaintiffs only the minimum value of the
crcps grown on their property for a number of years which could
not be determined with any degree of accuracy would not be
equitable.

The Court further determined that since this was not

a fee title taking cf plaintiffs' property, damages on the theory
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eminent domain are not proper either.,

The Court:'s decision

taking a compromise position that plaintiffs are entitled to the
fair market value of their property after deducting any residual
value to the landowner after defendant's use ended and the
property has been restored is fair and equitable under the
circumstances.

Not to allow the minimal amount of residual value

awarded would totally disregard the testimony presented that
defendant's use is limited in time.
It would be improper for the Court to assess damages based
on the fair market value of the property for residential purposes
inasmuch asi

(1)

The property had been used exclusively for

agricultural purposes; (2)

There was not a fee simple taking of

the subject property; (3) The highest and best use of the
property was not for a subdivision since there was no mdrkec for
a residential subdivision and a moratorium was in eftect
precluding such use; (4) The comparables used by all experts to
arrive at their opinions regarding values clearly do not justify
plaintiffs' expert's valuation; and (5) Plaintiffs' expert was
shown to be biased.
It would be improper for the Court to allow severance damage
inasmuch as this is not a condemnation case but a contract case.
Further, there is no credible evidence establishing plaintiffs'
property that was not utilized as the well site has been
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diminished in value.

The yearly rental of $450.00 per year on

the entire parcel continued without offset from the time the well
site was established.
The Court properly declined to award prejudgment interest
since plaintiffs' damages were not easily calculable and definite
which are requirements for awarding pre-judgment interest under
Utah lav:.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT DEFENDANT'S
CHOICE OF THE WELL SITE WAS REASONABLE AND PRACTICAL AND
THAT THE DEALINGS OF DEFENDANT WITH PLAINTIFF WERE CARRIED
OUT IN GOOD FAITH.
It is undisputed that the March 29, 1966 Oil and Gas Lease
gave defendant the right to enter onto plaintiff's property
construct and maintain the well site and access road.

and

Defendant:

was restricted as to where it could locate the well site due to
spacing restrictions of the Utah Division of Oil, Gas and Mining.
For geological reasons, defendant wanted to be as far southwest
as possible.

Mr. Edward Wicker and Bob Lewis flew over the

location and chose a couple of potential sites.

Based on

geological, economic and construction factors, it was determined
to locate the well on plaintiffs' property.
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Plaintiffs claim that defendant failed to enter into any
kind of reasonable negotiation as to the location of the wellsite or access road.

Such a claim is completely without merit.

It was Mr. Wicker who contacted plaintiff Carl Smith in order to
work out a mutual acceptable location for the well site and
access road and tu resolve the issue of compensation to
plaintiffs.

It was Mr. Smith who became upset and refused to

discuss alternatives on plaintiffs' property although defendant
had a contractual right to locate a well site thereon.

Mr. Smith

did not want the well site at any location on his property under
any circumstances.

All of his proposed alternative locations

were on adjoining ground.

As indicated by the testimony

previously quoted in the Statement of Facts, Mr. Smith refused to
discuss any options which involved placement of the well site and
road on his property. Mr. Smith made no good faith effort
whatsoever during the negotiations.

In fact, Mr. Smith was so

hostile to defendant's request, that Mr, Whicker asked him if he
intended to try to keep defendant off the property by the use of
a shotgun.
Plaintiffs attempt to show "bad faith" in the negotiation
process by the alleged "promise" of Mr. Whicker that unless his
offer was accepted, the case would be drug out in court and
plaintiffs would end up receiving less money.
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While Mr. Whicker

does not recall this conversation, such a statement would not be
an unreasonable response and merely states the obvious.
Counsel for plaintiffs next argues that defendant's decision
not to use James Curtis as a witness regarding property valuation
"shows as well a calculated effort on the part of defendant to
fulfill the other half of Mr. Whicker's prophecy, and clearly
demonstrates bad faith in a clear violation of lessee's duties".
Defendant's decision not to use Mr. Curtis as a witness was based
on his lack of qualifications to testify as an expert witness on
property valuations.

Mr. Curtis did not have any appraisal

designations and had never testified in court regarding property
valuations (R. at 300-301).

When plaintiffs' counsel attempted

to utilize Mr. Curtis as an expert witness regarding property
values, the Court refused to accept such testimony.
Plaintiffs rely on Flying Diamond Corporation vs. Rust, 551
P.2d 519 (1976) to support their claim that defendant's choice of
the well site was not reasonable and practical and defendant did
not deal in good faith.

In Flying Diamond, the property owner

Rust requested that Flying Diamond build an access road in from
the north which would

minimize damage and not interfere with

irrigation of Rust's lands.

Flying Diamond refused and proceeded

to construct the road coming in from the East.

The trial court

found that it was not necessary to build a road from the east,
that it could have come in from the north as Rust requested, and
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that the road as so constructed from the east prevented
defendants from irrigating 15 acres of land that had previously
been irrigated.

The Utah Supreme Court held Flying Diamond

liable for damage to said 15 acres because Flying Diamond had a
"reasonable alternative" of coming in from the norch which v^ould
have allowed the 15 acres to remain under irrigation and would
not have affected Flying Diamond's operation.
It is undisputed that under Flying Diamond vs. Rust, a
lessee can be liable for damage if it excessively uses or
unreasonably uses the surface in its operations.

However, in the

case at bar there is no evidence of excessive or unreasonable
use.

The testimony from Ed Whicker, the petroleum engineer for

Linmar, and Jerry Aired, a licensed surveyor, was that the size
and location of the drill site and the road way were reasonable.
Plaintiffs' only argument that defendant's use was unreasonable
was that the well should have been located off plaintiffs'
property and on someone else's land.

The district court in

Flying Diamond Corporation vs. Rust, addressed that issue in
paragraph 3 of its memorandum decision (Exhibit 23) and ruled
adversely to the position maintained by plaintiffs in this
action.

The district court held :

Further, the Court holds that the possible alternative'
rule should be applied under the facts of this case only
as to a possible alternative en the premises, and not:
where the possible alternative is tc locate the well site
on another's land.
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A lessee under an oil and gas lease may be liable for
damages under two different theories:

One is based on the damage

provisions in the lease, and the second is based on a reasonable
alternative or an excessive use of lessor's property.

Frankfort

Oil Company v. Abrams, 159 Colo. 535, 413 P.2d 190 (1966) which
was cited in Flying Diamond provides an example of contractual
liability under an oil and gas lease.

In Frankfort the landowner

had attempted to interfere with Frankfort's operation of drilling
several wells on the property, and the landlord was eventually
enjoined from such interference.

The landlord counterclaimed

seeking to recover damages of $14,500.00 for lands that Frankfort
had used in its drilling operations and for depreciation to other
lands which had not been used.

Frankfort had not used an

excessive amount of Abrams' property and there was no issue of a
"reasonable alternative".

The Colorado Court determined that

Abrams was not entitled to damages for depreciation to lands not
used by Frankfort.
The Utah Supreme Court agreed with the holding of the
Frankfort case, but properly distinguished the application of the
Frankfort case from the facts established in Flying Diamond
Corporation.

The Utah Supreme Court said:

We see no reason to disagree with the holding of the
Frankfort case and others like it, which deny coverage
for depreciation resulting to the landowner's other
property by the exercise of the right to extract. But
we do not see that this is inconsistent with the finding
of the trial court and the judgment rendered herein.***
When viewed in that light, it is apparent that the trial
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court found that because of the placement and manner of
construction of the plaintiff's road, preventing
irrigation of fifteen acres of the defendant's land,
its usefulness and value were diminished to the extent
of $750.00 per acre.
The decision in Flying Diamond is consistent with the
general law on this issue.

In 38 Amc Jure 2nd, Gas and Oil,

section 115, the law is summarized as follows:
The lessee's right to the use of the surface may, under
the proper circumstances, be such as to preclude any
surface operations other than his own„ And the mere
fact that the lessee could have conveniently placed
his operating facilities elsewhere than he did does not
entitle the surface owner to complain that the
particular placement was unreasonable.
By placing the well at the location it did, rather than at
some other location off plaintiffs' property, defendant attempted
to enhance the amount of oil and gas produced from the well,
minimize the cost of the location and minimize the impact to the
surface.

By attempting to enhance the ultimate recovery of oil

and gas, both parties benefit since they share proportionately in
the oil and gas proceeds.

The trial court properly determined

that the choice of the well site was reasonable and practical and
defendant negotiated with plaintiffs in good faith.
POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THE DAMAGES TO BE AWARDED
TO PLAINTIFF BASED ON PLACEMENT OF AN OIL WELL,
OIL WELL BATTERY, STORAGE TANKS AND ROAD ON DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY.
Defendant's position at trial regarding damages was that
plaintiffs' recovery was limited to damage to growing crops on
-14-

the subject property pursuant to paragraph 8 of the March 29,
1966 Oil and Gas Lease.

Inasmuch as the 4.76 acres is 23.8

percent of the 20 acre parcel, defendant argued that plaintiffs
were entitled to 23.8 percent of the $450.00 yearly rental or
$107.10 per year until such time as defendant moves the well site
and restores the property.

The Court rejected this position on

the basis that the nature and duration of defendant's use of the
property rendered it not useful for agricultural purposes in the
foreseeable future and it would not be fair and eguitable to
allow plaintiffs only the minimal value of the crops grown en
that property.
Plaintiffs allege that they are entitled to damages under an
eminent domain theory but have failed to cite to the court aiy
precedent for their position.

It is submitted that if

condemnation v/as applicable, defendant would receive fee title to
the subject property and would have been required to obtain an
order of immediate occupancy to go onto the property.

If the

Flying Diamond case was premised on eminent domain law, the Court
would have awarded interest at 8 percent which is the applicable
rate for condemnation cases.
The Courts have failed to apply the theory of eminent domain
under similar fact situations.

In O'Connor vs. Great Lakes

Pipeline Company, 63 F.2d 523 (8th Circuit, 1933), the owner of
480 acres of farmland sought to obtain damages in an amount of
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$1,200.00 for the alleged depreciation of their entire parcel of
land as a result of the operations carried on by Defendant
pursuant to a pipeline easement.

The claim was based upon a

clause in the agreement which provided for the reimbursement for
"...all damages to crops, surfaces, fences, and premises for and
because of laying of each line of pipe."

The trial court refused

to submit the question to the jury regarding depreciation of the
entire parcel.

The trial court ruled that depreciation was net

within the contemplation of the parties as an element of damages.
The appellate court affirmed, after noting that the right to
damages is governed by the written contract, not the law of
condemnation.

The Court held:

The damage, if any, for which payment was to be made
was provided by the contract. It was to crops,
surfaces, fences, and premises, not by the granting of tne
easement, but by the laying of each line of pipe....
Depreciation in the market value of the land was
evidently not in the mind of either party or different
language would have been used. The agreement no where
refers to this.
Plaintiff should not be allowed to receive the benefits of
the lease, i.e., the royalty, and then claim that although tl.e
ground is subject to a valid lease in favor of defendant,
plaintiff is not bound by the terms of the lease as to damages.
To allow plaintiff to recover damages under a theory of eminent
domain would be improper and without precedent.
Plaintiffs want to "have their cake and eat it too".
Specifically, plaintiffs want to be paid the full fee title value
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of the subject property now and then require defendant to turn
the property back to them when the recoverable oil has been
obtained.

That is simply overreaching by plaintiffs, and is far

beyond any damages provided for in the March 29, 1966 Oil and Gas
Lease.
In paragraph 2 of the Court's Ruling, the Court stated:
To allow plaintiffs only the minimal value of crops
grown on that property for a number of years which
cannot now be determined would not be equitable.
In a similar manner, to allow plaintiffs the fair market
value of a fee title interest in the 4.76 acre well site and then
restore the same to them after the oil and gas have been removed
would likewise not be fair and equitable.

Under the

circumstances, the courts compromised position if anything
substantially favors plaintiffs and they have no cause to
challenge the Court's decision.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERTY REFUSED TO ASSESS DAMAGES

BASED ON THE ALLEGED HIGHEST AND BEST USE OF PLAINTIFFS'
PROPERTY FOR RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES.
Plaintiffs' expert, Richard Palmer, testified that the
highest and best use of the subject property was for residential
purposes.

However, it is submitted that Mr. Palmer's opinion and

his $4,200.00 per acre valuation is impeached on the following
grounds:
(a)

Bias.

Mr. Palmer was aware of Howard Carroll'G

$2,000.00 per acre valuation and that said price was
-17-

not high enough for plaintiffs' purposes (Ro at 530).

Mr-

Palmer was hired to provide a higher property valuation and
plaintiff got what he paid for despite Mr. Palmer's
statements to Lynn Snow that it would be hard to justify
valuing the Smith parcel over $2,000.00 per acre

(R. at

689) .
(b)

Highest and Best U S P Not for Subdivision.

Mr. Peimer

testified the highest and best use of tne subject property
was for subdivision purposes.

Such an opinion is in

complete disregard of the following:
(i)

The property had always been used for

agricultural purposes (R. at 552).
(ii)

Duchesne County had a moratorium for subdivision

development at the time Linmar Energy started work on
the property (R. at 5 33).
(iii)

Since the purpose of annexation is to

annex completely adjacent parcels, annexation
probably would not have occurred since the subject
property was adjacent to Altamont in only one corner
(R. at 539).
(iv)

There was no demand for subdivision lots in

August, 1983. Mr. Palmer did not know how many
subdivisions were in Altamont, the number of lots
for sale in the Thacker subdivision, or how much
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property was available for sale in the fall of 1983.
He was further unaware of the drop in building
activity as established by County records showing
that home building permits dropped from 12 3 to 59
and mobile home permits dropped from 100 to 78 from
1982 to 1983 (R. at 546-549).
(v) Mr. Palmer had not done any calculations to
determine costs of installing road, sewer, water,
gas, electricity, and telephone lines if a
subdivision were developed.

Further, he did noc

consider architectural fees, legal fees, real
estate commission fees, etc., in determining if a
subdivision was feasible (R. at 554-559).
(vi) Mr. Palmer admitted that highest and best use
of property had to take into consideration "reasonable
and probable" use (R. at 553). A subdivision on
plaintiffs' property was neither reasonable nor
probable,
(c) Misuse of Comparable Sales.

The Smith property

constitutes a twenty acre parcel of ground.

Not a single

comparable located by Mr. Palmer involving a sale of
over ten acres produced a price of $2,000.00 per acre.
(R. at 565-566).

The 13.5 acre parcel which is locatea in

the same section sold for $1,850.00 per acre.
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Excluding the

one acre sale in a developed subdivision which sale is
clearly distinguishable, the average per acre sale price of
Mr, Palmer's comparables is $2,046.66 per acre.
Mr. Palmer justifies his $4,200.00 value because 4.76 acre
parcels are more valuable than 20 acre parcels.

While this

is true to a certain extent, at the time Linmar started
construction there was no road to the 4.7 6 acre piece.
Without access and the improved road, Mr. Smith would have
been lucky to get $2,000.00 per acre for the 4.76 acre
parcel.

Plaintiff should not be able to profit in this

action for the road constructed by Defendant at Defendant's
expense.
Using Mr. Palmer's logic and valuations, there are now three
remaining five acre parcels on plaintiffs' property which
are valued at $4,200.00 per acre.

The three five-acre

parcels thus have a total value of $63,000.00, whereas
before the entire property was only worth $50,000.00.
Therefore, plaintiffs have been rewarded rather than damaged
using Mr. Palmer's logic.
(d)

Fee Simple Valuation.

Mr. Palmer admitted his

valuation is based on a fee simple valuation.

Linmar Energy

is restricted in its use of the subject property, cannot
sell or transfer the same, and will eventually return
complete ownership to plaintiff (R. ar 570).
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(e) Water Right,

Mr. Palmer's valuation included a full

Indian right which Linmar Energy has no right or title to
(R. at 580).
(f)

Inexperience in Duchesne County.

Mr. Palmer's primary

experience in appraisal is on the Wasatch Front and his
appraisal experience in Duchesne County was limited to
possibly one appraisal per year (R. at 529).
Plaintiff Carl Smith's assertion that he wanted to develop
the subject property was a poor attempt to maximize his damages
from Defendante

Mr. Smith was unaware whether his property was

located in Duchesne County or Altamont City and was not aware of
the subdivision requirements for either entity.

Further, he was

not aware that a moratorium was in effect in Duchesne County and
had never obtained estimates of the cost of subdividing his
property.
Damages based on "highest and best use" is relevant to
condemnation actions and is not applicable to the case at bar.
Even if the court determined that a "highest and best use"
valuation was proper, the highest and best use of the subject
property is for agricultural purposes.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED NOT TO ALLOW

SEVERANCE DAMAGES.
Severance damages are also associated exclusively with
condemnation cases.

The March 29, 1966 Oil ana Gas Lease is the

-21-

document which governs the action of both parties and whatever
damages plaintiffs' are entitled to must be found within the
provisions of said contract.
Paragraph 8 of the Oil and Gas Lease provides:
"Lessee.. .shall pay for damages caused by its operation
to growing crops on said lands."
The damage provision is not all inclusive and does not require
Linirar to pay for all possible damages that Lessor's lands may
sustain.

It has been held that a provision in a lease

whereby

the lessee contracts to pay certain specific damages, including
those to growing crops, impliedly excludes all damages not so
expressed.

See Fulkerson v. Great Lakes Pipeline Co., 75 S.W.Pnd

844 (Missouri, 1934).
Severance damages were specifically rejected in connection
with an oil and gas lease in Frankfort Oil Company vs. Abrans,
Supra.

The Colorado Supreme Court held that the surface owners

damages are limited solely to the surface used and do not include
depreciation or severance damages to other lands not being uc~d.
The court held:
Without a lease provision the rule seems to be that
absent unreasonable use or statutory provisions or a
suit brought in tort for negligence, no payment is due
the surface owner for damages due to exploration or
drilling. 4 Summers Oil and Gas Section 652 (perm.ed.
(1962).... Absent a specific lease provision to extend
liability to cover the indirect loss of value of the
remaining land, we find that the lease itself was intended
only to cover loss due to lessee's actual authorized
operations on the land used.
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The case of Phillips Petroleum Company vs. Morris, 518
S.W.2d 444 (Texas, 1975) is somewhat similar to the Frankfort
case.

Morris sued for depreciation of the land permanently

damaged by Phillips' operations.

The damage clause of the lease

reguired lessee to pay for damages to crops or improvements
caused by operations of lessee.

The trial court awarded Mcrris

$1,391.00 for depreciation and Phillips Petroleum Company
appealed.

The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, and held that the

lessee was not liable for depreciation to the land.
In order for the Court to grant severance damages to the
plaintiff, it would have to disregard the holdings of both Flying
Diamond Corporation vs. Rust and Frankfort Oil Company vs.
Abrams, and would be in effect re-writing the oil and gas lease
to add a provision obligating the lessee to pay severance
damages.
Plaintiffs have attempted to torture the Court's decision in
the Flying Diamond case to force it to fit the facts in the case
at bar.

Plaintiffs argued that had Linmar placed the well in the

southeast corner of plaintiffs' property and provided access
along the east side, it would have minimized private injury and
any resulting damages to the remaining property would not have
been compensable.

If the drill site had been located in the

southeast corner and the road along the east side, it would have
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resulted in almost total destruction of plaintiffs' orchard and
it -v/ould have meant that the well site would be directly between
Altamont town boundary and the land which plaintiff claims he had
thought about subdividing.

If the well site had been built in

the southeast corner and the road constructed on the East
boundary, plaintiff would be complaining even mere.

Defendant is

trying to show some alternative location, no matter how
unreasonable it is.

In Flying Diamond the oil company had to pay

damages to 15 acres of property because the surface owner could
no longer irrigate the 15 acres because of the roadway.

In this

case, the roadway does not interfere in any way with the
remaining 15.24 acres.
Even if severance damage was applicable under the Oil and
Gas Lease, there has been no credible evidence establishing that
the 15.24 acres not part of the well site has diminished in
value.

Mr. Smith was receiving $450.00 per year for leasing the

entire parcel before defendant established the well site and has
continued to receive $450.00 per year thereafter.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY UTILIZED A RESIDUAL VALUE OF

$375.00 PER ACRE IN COMPUTING DAMAGES.
Defendant's right to occupy the premises must be construed
according to the March 29, 1966 Oil and Gas Lease.

Paragraph 2

of said Lease provides:
This lease shall remain in force for a term of 10 years
and as long thereafter as oil, gas, casing head gasoline,
or any of them as produced.
Paragraph 12 of the Oil and Gas Lease provides:
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If, after the expiration cf primary term of this lease,
production of the leased premises have ceased from
any cause, this lease shall not terminate provided
lessee resumes operations for drilling a well within
sixty (60) days from such cessation, and this lease
shall remain in force during the prosecution of such
operations and, if production results therefrom,
then as long as production continues.
The almost exact provision of the Oil and Gas Lease were
construed by the Court of Appeals in Haby v. Stanolind Oil and
Gas Company, 228 F.2d 298 (5th Circuit 1955).

In that case, the

lease in question was being held by production in the secondary
term.

The Texas Regulatory Commission issued an order having the

effect of shutting in all wells in the field in which the lease
in question was producing.

As a result, there was no production

from the lease for a period of nine months; during this period of
time the Lessee did nor commence any additional drilling or reworking operations although the lease contained a cessation of
production clause providing that "if after discovery of oil or
gas the production thereof should cease from any cause, this
lease shall not terminate if lessee commences additional drilling
or re-working operations within sixty days thereafter".

The

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
the lease had terminated.

The Court stated:

The parties here provided a savings clause in case
production ceased from any cause. In such event, tc
avoid the termination of the lease, the lessee must
commence additional drilling or reworking operations
within 60 days thereafter. It was possible for
Stanolind to comply with the requirement, but it did
not. The fact that additional drilling was
economically impracticable is no excuse. . . . The
lease fixed precisely enough the conditions upon which
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its continuance depended, and compliance with sucn
conditions was not excused by the acts of the Railroad
Commission heretofore described.
The defendant does not have an unlimited right to occupy the
7/^11 site.

Defendant can only occupy the premises for so long as

oil, gas or casinghead gas is produced or for a period of sixty
(60) days thereafter providing a new well or reworking operation::
are commenced.

The reserve reports prepared by defendant's

independent petroleum engineers estimate the production will
cease by 1996.

At that time, the lease will terminate sixty days

after the cessation of production, unless Linmar drills another
well.
Based on the foregoing facts, not to allow the minimal
amount residual value awarded would totally disregard the
testimony presented.

If error existed in the Court's decision,

the error would be in limiting the residual value of the property
to $375.00 per acre.
D.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY MADE AN ADJUSTMENT OF

C0MPARA3LES REFERRED TO BY EXPERT WITNESSES RATHER THAN
ACCEPTING AT FACE VALUE THE OPINION OF ONE OF THE EXPERTS.
Plaintiffs' counsel argues that the trial court erred in
taking the two most comparable sales used by the appraisers and
making adjustments thereto to arrive at the market value of the
subject property.

Plaintiffs' position on this issue is

absolutely wrong.

In 31 Am Jur 2nd, Expert and Opinion
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Evidence, section 183, the law regarding the conclusiveness or
controlling effect of expert testimony is summarized as follows:
There is, generally speaking, no rule of law which
requires controlling effect or influence to be given to, and
the court and jury are not required to accept in place of
their own judgments, the opinion testimony of expert
witnesses, merely because of the special knowledge of the
witnesses concerning the matters upon which they give
their testimony. Expert opinions are not ordinarily
conclusive in the sense that they must be accepted as
true on the subject of their testimony, but are generally
regarded as purely advisory in character; the jury may
place whatever weight they choose upon such testimony and
may reject it, if they find that it is inconsistent with
the facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable. The
weight given to expert testimony is for the trier of the
facts, who is not required to give it controlling influence.
Utah Courts have consistently determined that courts
may give whatever weight they deem appropriate to expert
testimony.

In Nevnneyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d at 1276 (Utah

1987), the husband challenged the court's determination of the
fair market value of the family home in arriving at a property
cettlement in a divorce action.

The husband's expert testified

that the home was worth $122,000.00 and the wife's expert valuad
the home at $112,000.00.

The trial judge fixed a value at

$117,000,00 and the husband argued it was error for the court to
"split" the difference between the values fixed by the experts.
In rejecting this position and holding the trial court did noi:
aouse its discretion in determining the value of the home, zhe
court stated:
...•It is elementary that a judge is not bound to believe
one witness's testimony to the total exclusion of that
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of another witness. When acting as the trier of fact, the
trial judge is entitled to give conflicting opinions
whatever weight he or she deems appropriate. 746 P.2d at
1278.
In the case at bar, plaintiffs' expert valued the property
at $4,200.00 per acre and defendant's expert valued the property
at $2,000.00 per acre.

This large discrepancy in valuation is

difficult to understand especially since the experts utilized rhe
identical comparable sales in arriving at their valuations.

As

indicated in Point IIA above, there was ample reason for the
Court not to take plaintiffs' expert's valuation at face value.
While defendant is of the opinion the Court should have accepted
the 52,000.00 per acre valuation, the Court's method in utilizing
the sales data presented and making minor adjustments thereto is
consistent with the Court's function.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED NOT TO
ALLOW PLAINTIFF PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST.

The law in Utah regarding pre-judgment interest is set forth
in Blork vs. April Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315 (Utah, 1977).
The Court held:
As to the allowance of interest before judgment, this
Court has heretofore spoken, and the law in Utah is clear,
viz: where the damage is complete and the amount of the
loss is fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be
measured by facts and figures, interest should be allowed
from that time and not from the date of the judgment. On
the other hand, where damages are incomplete or cannot be
calculated with mathematical accuracy, such as in case of
personal injury, wrongful death, defamation of character,
false imprisonment, the amount of the damage must be
ascertained and assessed by the trier of the fact at the
trial, and in such cases prejudgment interest is not
allowed." (Emphasis added). 560 P.2d at 317.
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Unlike Bjork where pre-judgment interest was awarded because
the value of the shares of stock and plaintiffs' damages were
easily calculable and definite, damages in this case cannot be
calculated with mathematical certainty.

Plaintiffs' complaint

sets forth causes of action for an alleged trespass, taking and
compensation in eminent domain and excessive or unreasonable use
of the surface.

Defendant's position, consistent with the

language of the March 29, 1966 Oil and Gas Lease, is that
plaintiffs are only entitled to damages to the crops on the
leased premises.

With the theories of recovery and the

appraisals so divergent, it is impossible to calculate with
mathematical certainty any damage sustained by plaintiffs.
The cases footnoted in Bjork in support of the above quoted
statement are utilized by plaintiffs in their Memorandum
justify awarding pre-judgment interest.

to

However, an examination

of these cases show they are clearly distinguishable. In Fell v.
Union Pacific, 32 Ut.101, 88 P.1003 (1907) the value of sheep
which died during transit and the amount of weight loss suffered
by other sheep can easily be ascertained according to fixed ruies
of evidence and known standards of value.

In Jack V. Parsons

Construction v. State of Utah, 552 P.2d 107 (Utah 1976),
calculating pre-judgment interest on monies owing under a
contract was easily determined.

Finally, in Uintah Pipeline

Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885 (Utah 1976), the court
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had no trouble allowing pre-judgment interest for the destruction
of personal property where the cost of rebuilding a compressor
was subject to computation.
Assuming arguendo, that the court should determine prejudgment interest is applicable, it could only be awarded at 6
percent rather than the 10 percent requested by plaintiffs.
Section 15-1-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, provides:
Except when parties to a lawful contract agree on a
specified rate of interest, the legal rate of interest: for
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in
action shall be ten percent per annum. Nothing in this
section may be construed to in any way affect any penalty
or interest charge which by law applies to delinquent
or other taxes or to any contract or obligations made
before May 14, 1981. (Emphasis added.)
Section 15-1-1 was amended May 14, 1981, to increase the interest
rate from six percent to ten percent and change the date at the
end of the last sentence from 1907 to 1981. After the 1981
amendment, the section was interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court
in SCM Land Company vs. Watkins and Faber, 732 P.2d 105 (Utah,
1986).

In the SCM Land Company case, defendant, on July 9, 1979,

executed a renewal lease agreement for office space in the
Newhouse Office Building.

The lease was for three years, ai.d the

defendant vacated the building prior to the end of its lease.
The trial court ruled that the defendant had breached the lease
and a verdict was entered in favor of the plaintiff for lost
rent, remodeling expenses, and attorney's fees and costs.
Plaintiff was awarded ten percent prejudgment interest.

-30-

The

Supreme Court affirmed the decision, except as to the award of
ten percent interest.

The Court held that interest should only

be awarded in the sum of six percent.

Plaintiffs attempt to

distinguish SCM by showing the breach or default occurred prior
to the change in the statutory interest rate.

However, the

court's decision was based on the date of the lease agreement and
not the date of default.

The Court stated:

Faber's next point is that the trial court erred in
allowing statutory interest of ten percent on the
damages occurring after May 14, 1981, the date the
statutory rate was changed, because the lease that was
breached was executed prior to May 14, 1981. Section
15-1-1 (Supp. 1981) provided:
The legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance
of any money, goods, or things in action shall be ten
percent per annum. But nothing herein contained shall
be so construed as to in any way affect any penalty or
interest charged which by law applies to delinquent or
other taxes or to any contract or obligations made
before the 14tb day of May, 1981.
On this point, Faber is correct, and the judgment
should be modified to allow six percent interest only,
the rate in effect prior to May 14, 1981. 732 P.2d
at 108, 109.
Since the oil and gas lease was entered into prior to May
14, 1981, at most, plaintiff would only be entitled to
prejudgment interest at the rate of six percent.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, defendant requests that this Court
affirm the trial court's decision in all respects.

Tes^y-Aj. Christiansen
ADKINS & CHRISTIANSEN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERS
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of May, 1989, I
delivered four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to
Gordon A. Madsen and Robert C. Cummings, Attorneys for
Plaintiffs, 225 South 200 East, #150, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

ADDENDUM
Ruling
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav/
Judgment
Oil and Gas Lease

IN THE EIGHTH

JUDICIAL

D I S T R I C T COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CARL N. SMITH and DAWNA
LaVERNE SMITH,
Plaintiffs,

R U L I N G

vs.
LINMAR ENERGY CORPORATION, a
Delaware corporation,
Defendant,

Civil No. 8 5-CV-2D

Having fully considered the evidence received and the closing
arguments and memoranda of counsel, the court rules as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages on their

theory of eminent domain, but are entitled to be compensated for
the damage to crops on the property used by Defendant.
2.

The use to which Defendant has put the property is

of such ncture and duration that it is rendered unusable to the
Plaintiffs for agricultural purposes in the foreseeable future.
Thus, the extent of damage to crops amounts to virtually a total
taking of the property by Defendant.

To allow Plaintiffs only

the minimal value of crops grown on that property for a number of
years which cannot now be determined would not be equitable.
3.

The value of such a taking can most accurately be

f-easj-rad by determining the fair market value of the property and
deducting any residual value tc the landowner after
us-j has enCed and the property resto

L^fhi^t^zSs

iu< -^r ,/w
C" -.
r?n J^ T oic^ t

4.

Defendant's choice of the well-site was reasonable

cind practical, and the dealings of Defendant's agents with
Plaintiffs were carried out in good faith.
5.

There being no evidence that the Defendant's use of

the property adversely affected the argicultural use of the
remainder of Plaintiffs1 property, Plaintiffs are not entitled to
severance damages.
b.

The value of the property at the time the well-site

was constructed was $3,750.. 00 per acre.

The most comparable sales

used by the appraisers were the Cummings/Rule sale, at $3,530.00
per acre, and the Wheeler/Stanley sale at $3,300.00 per acre.

The

subject property is closer to a town than the comparables, thus
justifying a higher value.

The property has seme possible residual

value to Plaintiffs, which the ccurt determines to be $375.00 per
acre.

The court finds that despite good faith effort by Defendant,

the 1*39 acre parcel has not been restored, and Plaintiffs' damages
continue.

Thus, Plaintiffs are awarded damages as follows:
4.76 acres 9 $3,375.00 per acre
(3750 - 375) = $16,065.00
7.

Plaintiffs are net entitled to pre-judgment interest.

The court has been required to determine the value of the taking
of real estate for an uncertain period of time, and to fashion an
equitable award based thereon.

Thus, damages cannot be measured

as of a certain time, or according to certain figures.
DATED this /)/% day of June, IS88.
BY THS COURT:

^•^^z^?

cc:

Gordon Am Madse^

0
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GORDON A.
ROBERT C.
Attorneys
225 South
Salt Lake
Telephone
1W

6th C «:-c: Court DdChc:-.e
State o* Utah

MADSEN, #2048
GUMMINGS, #777
for Plaintiffs
200 East, #150
City, Utah 84111
322-1141
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CARL N. SMITH and,
DAWNA LaVERNE SMITH,

]

>

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]

Civil No.85-£y>2D
0

Plaintiffs,

vs.
LINMAR ENERGY CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation,

ATH*" -

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the
honorable Dennis L. Draney, judge of the above court, sitting
without a jury, on the 5th and 6th of April, 1288.

Plaintiffs

were represented by Gordon A. Madsen and Robert C. Cummings, and
the defendant was represented by Robert W. Adkins and Terry L.
Christiansen.

The plaintiffs having produced evidence, and the

defendant having produced evidence, and both sides having rested,
and closing arguments having been presented by memoranda from the
parties, and the Court, being advised, makes and enters the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1.

Plaintiffs are, and during all material times were,

owners of a twenty-acre tract of land located adjacent to the city

limits of the town of Altamont in Duchesne Counry described as
follows:
The East 1/2 of the Northwest 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4
of Section 25, Township 1 South, Ranqe 4 West, USM.
2.

On or about March 29, 1966, an Gil and Gas Lease

was entered into bv Hyrum W. Smith and Emily M. Smith, his wife,
as lessors, and Walter Duncan, as lessee*

Plaintiffs, at all

material times, were successors in interest to said lessors and to
lessor's interest in said Oil and Gas Lease, and at all material
times defendant was successor in interest to the lessee's interest
in and to said Oil and Gas Lease.
3.

During the iron\h of August 1?83 the defendant

entered upon the aforesaid 20-tract and placed in the southwest
corner an oil well, an oil well battery and storage tanks.

At the

same time the defendant constructed an access road from the County
road on the north to che said oil well, oil well battery and
storage tanks, said road running north and soutn along the west
boundary of said tract.

The oil well, oil well oakery, storage

tanks and road occupied 4.76 acres of the said 20-acre tract, and
said 4.76 acres thus occupied by the defendant is hereinafter
referred to as the "well-site.'1
4.

At the time of the entry by defendant as aforesaid

the property was being used by plaintiffs for agricultural
purposes.

5.

The Court finds chat the defendant's choice of said

well-site was reasonable and practical, and the dealings of
defendant's agents with plaintiffs were carried out in good faith.
6.

In paragraph 8 of the said lease it is provided

chat the leasee "shall pay for damage caused by its operations to
growing crops on said land."

The Court finds that the said well-

site had thereon growing crops within the meaning of said lease
provision at the time of said defendant's entry thereon.

The said

use to which defendant has put the well-site is of such nature and
duration that it is rendered unusable to plaintiffs for
agricultural purposes in the foreseeable future, and such damage
to growing crops and to said land for agricultural purposes
amounts to virtually a total taking of the property by defendant:,
and the Court finds that the value of such taking by defendant can
most accurately be measured by determining the fair market value
of the well-site and deducting any residual value to the landowner
after defendant's use has ended and the property restored.
7.

The Court finds that it would be inequitable (and

contrary to said lease) to allow plaintiffs as damages only the
minimal value of crops grown on the property for a given number of
years, which term cannot now be determined.
8.

The Court finds that the fair market value of the

well-site at the time defendant entered thereon and constructed
said improvements was $3,750 per acre.

The Court finds that the

most comoarable sales used by the appraisers were the Cummings/

Rule sale at $3,530 per acre and the Wheeler/Stanley sale at
$3,300 per acre.

The Court finds that the subject property is

closer to a town than the comparabies, thus justifying such higher
value.

The Court further finds that the property has some

possible residual value to plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as
"residual value"), which the Court finds to be $375 per acre.
9.

The Court finds that defendant took some steps

toward restoration with regard to 1.39 acres of the said wellsite, but the Court further finds that, despite such good-faith
effort by defendant, the said tract was not restored, and
plaintiffs' damages with respect thereto continue.
10.

The Court finds that plaintiffs have been damaged

in the amount of the difference between the fair market value of
$3,750 per acre and the residual value to the owner of $375 per
acre.

The Court therefore finds that plaintiffs were damaged in

the amount of $3,375 per acre ($3,750 per acre fair market value
less $375 per acre residual value) multiplied by 4.76 a:res,
yielding a total damage to the plaintiffs of $16,065.00.
11.

The Court has been required to determine the value

of the taking of the well-site for an uncertain period of time,
and to fashion an equitable award based thereon, and therefore the
Ccurt finds that damages cannot be measured as of a certain time
or according to certain figures, and therefore the Court finds
that plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment interest.
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12.

The Court finds that plaintiffs are not entitled to

damages on their theory of eminent domain, but are only entitled
to be compensated for damage on the property used by defendant for
its well-site for agricultural purposes as heretofore found by the
Court.
13.

The Court further determines that there is no

evidence that the defendant's use of the well-site adversely
affected the agricultural use of the remainder of plaintiffs1
property, and finds that plaintiffs are not entitled to severance
damages.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
and enters the following
CONCLUSIONS Of LAW:
1.

Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against

the defendant in the sum of $16,065 (based upon the virtual
destruction of the property for agricultural purposes, and that
the measure of such damages is the difference between the fair
market value of the well-site at the time of defendant's entry and
the aforesaid residual value), together with interest thereon at
the rate of twelve percent per annum from the date hereof.
2.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages on any

eminent domain theory, nor are plaintiffs entitled to severance
damages.
3.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment

interest.
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4.

Plaintiffs are entitled to costs.

DATED the

"^"^

day of ^^72^.

6^1, 1983.

BY THE COURT:

r

/'

^C^Z-'f'

+

DISTRICT JUDGE

*.<£>

?
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed to Robert W. Adkins and
Terry L. Christiansen, attorneys for defendant,. P. 0. Box 660,
Coalville, Utah

84017, postage prepaid, this

/ 'S -"'" day of

August, 1988.
/

. .> < ^ . -

Attorney for Plaintiff

GORDON A.
ROBERT C.
Attorneys
225 South
Salt Lake
Telephone
1W

MADSEN, 42048
CUMMINGS, #7 77
for Plaintiffs
200 East, #150
Citv, Utah 84111
322-1141

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CARL N. SMITH and,
DAWNA LaVERNE SMITH,
Plaintiffs,
JUDGMENT
vs.
LINMAR ENERGY CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation,

Civil No.85-CV-2D

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the
Honorable Dennis L. Draney, judge of the above court, sitting
without a jury, on the 5th and 6th of April, 1988.

Plaintiffs

were represented by Gordon A. Madsen and Robert C. Cummings, and
the defendants were represented by Robert W. Adkms and Terry L.
Christiansen.

The plaintiffs having produced evidence, and tne

defendant having produced evidence, and both sides having rested,
and closing arguments having been presented by memoranda from the
parties, and the Court, having heretofore entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law,
NOW, THEREFORE, upon motion of Cordon A. Mad sari .and
l'ctCour!Suchecne

Robert C. Cummings, attorneys for the plaintiffs, °

State of uta.l

S£p
JL

i-J

/ ^ 1988

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AMD DECREED that
plaintiffs are hereby awarded judgment against the defendant in
the sum of $16,065, together with interest thereon at the rate of
twelve percent per annum from the date hereof, together with costs
in the amount of $
DATED the

.
^^>

dav of -ydbsS&'StstM,

1988.

BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT JUDGE

J/T~

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing prorcsed
Judcmpnt was mailed to Rcberr W. Adkins and Terry L. Christiansen,
attorneys for defendant, P. 0. 3ox 660, Coalville, Utah
postage prepaid, this

Sf

S4017,

day of August, 1988.

,>--^TC

^'y-A

Attorney for Plaintiff

KSffi-'ac-u,

Bw

OIL AND GAS LEAS?

THIS AGREEMENT, Entered into this the

_..

29th

__d.y

Hvrum W. Smith and E m i l y M . Smith,
Route l r B o x 4 5 B
Clearfield, Utah

of

March

h^_wife_

.hereinafter

Walter Duncan,

called

lessor

P . O . B o x 13 7, D u r a n g o . C o l o r a d o
hereinafter caned !•_*« doe. «»».»
One and m o r e - - > - - . - « - - - - - _
1 . 0 0 <_ m o r e

1 That leaser, for and in consideration of the sum of w * * w
~
_
Do 'ars if
>
In hand paid and of the covenants and agreements hereinafter contained to be performed b> the lessee has tMs day granted and leased and hereby grants
leases and lets unto the leasee for the purpose of mining and operating for and producing oil and gas caainghead cas and casinghead gasoline la>ing pipe
lines building tank*, storing oil building powers stations telephone lines and other struc urea thereon to produce s a \ e take rare of and manufacture all of

Duchesne
such substanees and for housing and boarding employees the following described tract of land in
. •,
,. . w —
County,
JJtQJl
•»_-., ____________________________________________-»„

T o w n s h i p 1 South, Range 4 W e s t , U S M ;
Section 25: EJNWjSWJ

..

—

•__

!

„

20700

'

in Section , ...
Tft>w«mp
Range
and containing
• -»•«« more or less
a This lease shaii remain la force for a term of ten (10» years and as long thereafter as o.l gas caainghead gas casinghead gasoline or any of them
is produced
3 The lessee shall deliver to the credit of the lessor as rovalty free of cost in the p pe I ne to ahich lessee mat connect ts « r is the equal one-eighth
part Of all oil produced and saved from the leased premises or at the l e s s e e s option ma\ pa> to the lessor for such one eighth ro>_lt> the market price for
oil of like grade and gravity prevailing on the day such oil ts run into the pipe lane or nto storage tsnics
a
The lesaee shall pay lessor as royalty one-eighth of the proceeds from the sale of the gas as such for g_s from aells a here gas only is 'ound and
mhcre not aold shali pay **ifty ifMOQt Dollars per annum as ro>alty from each such aell . i d ahile such ro>al > u *o paid sucn aell wh.il be he d to be a
producing well under paragraph numbered n o hereof The lessor to have gas free of charge from any gas aell on the le»»ed premi«cs for stove* and inside
iichta in the principal dwelling house on said land by matting his own connections aith t i e met) the use of said gas to be at the es*or % %o e risk -r d ex
pense The lessee ahall pay to lessor for gas produced from any oil aell and used b> the lessee for the manufacture of gasol ne or an> other product as royalty one-eighth of the market value of such gas at the mouth of t h e well If said gas is so d by the lessee then a . rov.lt> one eighth of the proceeds of
the sale thereof
ft If operations for the drilling of a well for oil or gas are not commenced on said land on or before one >ear from this date this lease shall terminate
sws to both parties unieaa the leasee snail on or before one year from this date pay or tender to the lessor or for the lessor s credit in the

f

State Savings and Loan A s s o c i a t i o n
Its successors

_, „

Clear field,

_Bank at_
>2
.
Rank _ t .
which bank and its successors are the lessor s agent and sha'I continue as the depository

Utah

*
of i n ) and all sums

gardless of changes of ownership in said land or In the oil and gas or in the rentals to accrue thereunder

the sum »'

payable

««• w e n i y

under

this

nr
lea_>e re

a n Q nQ / 1UU —

•

20. 0 0

.Dollars
»_2L_L_____
t ahich shall operate a«
rental and cover the privilege of deferring the commencement of drilling oper-tions for s period of one \ear In like manre- and upon like p-\vme
. _.
tenders the commencement of drilling operations rna> be further deferred for Ike pc-o-< ^ c c c s s n elv Al pmmrnts. or tenders -r-vv be mnCe bv c»~eck or
draft of lessee or an> assignee thereof mailed or delivered on or before the rental pav r>g da e
Not w ithstand ng the death o
lie
^or or his succes o
in interest the pavment or tender of rentals in the manner provided above shall be b i d i * on the heirs dev see* executors and ad s i -.ira or* of »u h. per^o6 If at i n ) time prior to the discovery of oil or gas on this land and during the te-m of this lease the ie* ee sha I dr 1 a drj hole or I o ~s or t n % and
this lease shall not terminate provided operations for the drilling of a m ell shall be ccrrrre-ced u tth n tuelv e n omhs frotn t le expirat unof he -v r e .1 pe od
for which rental has been paid or provided that »ith n said period the leasee begins or rts TICS the j»>me t of entals n the n nncr a-d am^
hf c n above
provided and In Una e*«.nt the preceding par-graph* hereof governing the pajmert of r
a]<> and the manner and effect thereof sh I cor rue n force
7 In case said lessor owns a less interest in the above described land than the entire and undivided fee simple estate therein
then the rovalties and
rentals herein provided for shall be paid the said lessor only in the proportion mhich his -tereat bears to the »hole a i d undivided fee
,
* Th? I*ssee shall have the right to use free of cost gas oil and water found on said and for u s operations thereon except water from the aells of the
lessor when required bv lessor the lessee shall bur> pipe lines below ploa depth and s w all p*> for damage caused b\ its operations to c-o* ne crops on
KM d land No aell shall be drilled nearer than 200 fee- to the house or barn n o * on said p etrusc- «, t h o u - n t t e n c o i s m t of the lesso- Le-see shal have he
right o nn> time during or after the exp ation of this lease to remove all machinery f x .res houses but d ncs and o licr structures p -c« c on sa d premises
luc udini the right to draw and remove all casing
°^lt l*\5 " t a t e of either partv hereto is assigned <and the privilege of a«-tgnlng in a hole or in part « expressiv alo«ed>
the cmenan s hereof «ha I
extend to tne netrs executors administrators successors and as«tgi s but no change o* exnersh p in the 1 md or in the> rentals o- roval tes sh«ll be o nd ns;
on the lessee until after notice to the lessee and it has been furnished with the »r ten t an«fer or a«s g mini or a certified copv t h i ' i o f Xn the event thii
lease shall be assigned as to a part or a i to parts of the above described lands and t i e r- 1er or o u t e r (»f an> such part or parts «h-\ I l i
or m i t e def-u
in the payment of the proportionate part of the rm due from him or t h e n >uch di au i hell not o rri «. to d i ' »t or af'cct tMs lease :n »o f vr as i COVCM
a part or p_rt* of said land upon ahieh the said leasee or anv a*.«igx;«e 1 ereof shall msl r c t- pavment vl snid ren i s
If at ai v i me the r he a« man, *s
four parties entitled to rentals or royalties lessee mav althhold pavmrnts thrrtof unlo s at d un I ail parties dr* cna c in a r t r*. r a rcro antic n s t r u
ment to be filed - l i h he lessee a con tron agent to receive all payment* due hereunder »nd to execute d \ sion a i d trarsfer orders o n bclal ot s a d pan es
and their respective successors in title
10 Lessor herebv aarran s and agrees to defend the title to the land here n dc>er bed and acrcrs tha the le*«ee ut lt« opt on m v p_\ -ind discharge
anr tsxes mortgages or other liens existing levied or assessed on or nea nst the abme -eserihid l md^ and n e v i u it exert ses «uci out on it shall be
suorogated to the rights of »n\ holder or holders the eof and mav reirbursc u*e f b> applv ing to the discharge of anv such mor cage
ax or o
r lien an>
rovaltv or rentals accruing hertunder
_ _ . . l l . _ f * o t u , t n s t * n < l t , } e »n>thlng in this lease contained to the contrarv
it is e x v e s * v »rrred that if >*s*ce s^a 1 COT ne-ice d-1 Insr I P r- i-ns at an> t me
ti . e l i « i f TK-« *".ll?«« c e « , ' i * * • - * • *«• 1 remain in force and Its term sha I con ut so org as - j c h o?v-_t ors are p-o«ecutcd and if production r t i j ttliere rom then as long as production continues
t««-} 2 f~, If ,J_ U £im.l5L*CJ J r l r r a r \ t ' J m . o f t n , s l e f t S * production on the "en*ed p-em ves sh » 1 re «e from anv cvuse
his lr«se s M 1 not er unate r-ov ded opera
I V ^ . i i tm »5_ I n15l
• »«•! *h*" be commenced re ore or on the n e x . en« i n< rr
I p« ng datr or -rov ded les e Urg ns or re u-nes
l e p j j n t r af
" " ? rrifL .'JT* ,r«- fn. »~ou»t »i*re nbefore provided If »f ce the evpirt len of the r
-s a -^ t e - m of h s ( i « p-od-c an on the leased pret-t se< sha 1
frf.JT / I _ m A7iT-^?U * , t n , s >•-*» »h-*U not tern iiace provided lessfv r e « u n « o-><- it - i fo- i
»_ n u e I •» t h t s x v 60 dav$ Com *uch cc a on and tn s
le-se shall remajn in forct during the p-osecu on of such operation* a i d if y - c f u c t r n r _
theref-om then as o - w as. produc or cot t nues
1
t e » . e I 3 . n i f _n<> rlri"?^-? Tel'*'* **"£l h»-eaftern nbeboaned in severalty or n s e w - r a i c tracts
he p-erris.es re er l e i « s
»n be d e v e l o x d and o erated a« o«e
InVe !>»• -eiI.-^. > V-«_^ K r u m cB h * r *enu ns-c" p r *
" *
treated as an ent re v «u _ hal be d ided arrong and p-id to su«.h -ep irate u« ' s in the p-oport on
u t
n r
on %rLae
i f l fr.^.v *JJ« _V, _* !? *V _ ^ ^ «» f
be»-% to the entire 1--*. d acrcnge T"ere s» all he no oil nation em the p_rt of the leasee o ol'set acl s
P
r°ee»v f,- , . » d It.
°_»f»»ch the land
covered
bj. this lease ma> be herea' er div ded bv ale devise
or oil era se or to furnish * e p a n «• me««urin« or
x Rt
ln
" c „ _ " • l*f"_".
*„i*, „„re,b> ******
* „ ,tnxl
,*"•"
e\ct\i d thii
le_se shal
bv a««tg-<d a c J. pnr or _s to part' of the al>ov e ocsenoeu t nd and 1c h e d e r
or m a k e
?h-?i nne oLrJW ?« f?. fP."rl o r ?*"* ,\txml\
« f *ult in t h e pavrrent of H e i rcpor lonate part of the rent due from him or then «jcn de auit
iTJk- i « . ,n.»^«,««, « ? M
.V r°e affect tin*
leas, in so far
as
it covers a
partp a ror
parts
n'
. d
_nd
inon
*hirh the sn d lessee or anv a«s gr ei -ereof s h a l
a l a n > , l m e i n e r e
D
a s m a n >
f o u r
l c
r n
e d
r
l
r
fe«. _i?J unti _Ti?«,_*«,_» i_ „i*l* "
*
»*
"
° ' - * o«" °*a tie« lessee n av «• , I hold p» nrr s thereof un
iifd to •«nr„f*^rf.?»o«o _^t3f ? n t t t e , , n »"t>n* in a recordable instrument to be filed •» tl he essee a corriron agent to r« ceivr all p_> mems d-c hereunder
and to execute ttixuton and transfer orders on behalf of said parties and their rtspee ivc successors in title
i 0
tt>*rlZr JO'YMS i^__r*KArnht. l i m * * n d f r o m llm*
V m ? surrender this lri*e as to anv par o par s of he ta.cd premises b> de.ivcrln? or ma ng a release
mereof to the lesaor or bv placing a release iiereof of record in tne proper count)
15 This lease and al. its terms conditions and stipulations shall extend to and be t rd ng on al' success©-* of said lessor o- lessee
tt
l
l
ln
led
ollea covenant » h%rVLV i f ° i « ~ ^ , f " T . \
«n mhole or In part nor «hall lessee be h i d ^bie in damages for 'allure to con plv with th* express or tmriuifnni
» ! t t h i • l f e j e ° 7 f _ , * r e ' , h e r « * , t h »* » r * v e n t e < 1 b> o r lt * u c n f«* « " *• ' " * result of any Fedtral or S t a c
a >* s
xecu
L orde-s rule, or
b 7 ^ r - ?- of i , i » o , h . . i , " . . h ' - P / 1 i r , n l e r m h c r e o r . s u c n term has not been ex end-d -v produc Ion or dr ng as n this
u - prov dirt
. r d lessee
d
he eo? h i be eitended £ , . . ' , « n
causes is unable to drill a mell on the lei*e d p-e ses 'or oil o- g*s the p r n t r
t e - - % d »e rental proi s o n
,
i
1,>
OI
e r
lw
aselawne e a u »
DurfnS _«l° ^*i l!. . J" V » * «
>ear until the first annuersarv h e_ ucc-rnng ninet>
«0 or m o r e d a v s
«, J ! i » « the r - o w l of such
#IZ**\*V££ ltSU£:Z ISlll'Z^xn*? tl*"t!rc: -1Sfbf«.e? P f 0 < 1 U C e ' ^ ° r m m ™ * n % P r ° d J C l S r r o m l h « X "*«« P " « » * « *»» r . _ s 0 0 c« . r of he above
e
a t l t s
llon
t l m
nel
t
lit»» U
K . rfi , !* "- ?e n t n * r i * n
*»^
»n> «*
from
time to pool or unitize all or anv p t * i or part* o ' t - e above dr
„ f l h ; r t i^Vrf
,*:Vrt \»»,
e!,i,Ir
°*Uon a»*
»«>
—*• -» " - ^
o m time to tirn
_ _^Td .IT, \ *
Jl,XV«'r u J V ira , , l e%* " * r u oi e ri '*••**«
«» the immediate vicinity thereof such paollr? to be ir»o units no. exceeding the m i imum stre t *c on «h ch
r
fuen J- «^m
Tm 2[",!?.
J?/
.t J?
*t r n c o
^-wl-tiong
in force at the time of such poo rg or unitization provided hoaever
that sucii units ma) exceed
m i m b
10l n
r
h%ft
r
f
!-f,T / ^ , ? «
. * L J J? *
•
" » "^*cn excess is necessary tn order to conforr- t
«hip subdivisions or lease lire*
Lcs—c sha 1 exere se

XN WITNESS THEREOF

a* sign the da> and > ear first

—
—

_

above

arltten

y/^/? ,J7 ~V1~' ^f-'TV-'l/Cj/
i S B U M W . SMITH

_

/ / lvvi.A\,V
—

—

EMTT.V

-\<r

^ ^ ^
C;TVTTT-R

^

^\v\v

Jdci..

STATE OF- U T A H
• } . . . ACKNOWLEPGMKNT FOR INDIVIDUAL (Kans.. Okla.. and Colo.)
COUNTY O F . <&Si
s>
Before me, the umlersigncd. a Notary Public0 within and for *uid county and state, on thi.<«_
J a y

„,

S.,.-. /

in

6

6

personally .ppe.rcd

H y r u m W.

Smith

E m i l v M. S m i t h , h i s w i f e
personally known to be the identical person^Lwho executed the within ami foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me
-free and voluntary act and deed for the use.* and purpose? therein act forth.
t h e y ..executed the same as. t h e i r
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and officj>l-s*al the day and yepjMast aUove^w^ittcja*
^
Mr c o - n ^ o n expire

9>A /<

?

STATE OF
COUNTY OFday ~f
mr
"^

^g.

^^^^^^^f^^r^^
Notary rubhe. •<*

"> ss. ACKNOWLEDGMENT FOR INDIVIDUAL < Kans^Okla.. an3 Colo.)

Before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public, within and for said county and state, on this1Q
, personally appeared

to me personally known to be the identical person
who executed the within and foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me
_executed the same a s .
Jfree and voluntary act and deed for the uses* and purposes therein set forth.
.hatIN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and official seal the day and year last above written.
My commission «**ptr»«

Notary Public.

STATE OF
COUNTY OF-

ACKNOWLEDGMENT FOR CORPORATION

On thi.«„
_day of—
„. A. D., 10
. before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public
n and for the county and state aforesaid, personally appeared—
-___«___—_-____-____--___»_=
,
:o me personally known to be the identical person who signed the name of the maker thereof to the within and foregoing
-President and acknowledged to me thatnstrument as its.executed the same as-free and
voluntary act and deed, and as the free and voluntary act and deed of said corporation, for the uses and purposes therein set forth.
Given under my hand and seal the day and year last above written.
^Iy commission *»*piri»«
Notary Public.

'J

i J.
S

"J

: * s>

'U

* J ^ Si

3

>J > j

S

» -s ^ •£.. J

^

NOTE:

i^ 1

1

15 =

c

^

•£

When signature by mark in Kansas. !«aid mark to bo \\itnv«"*«*<l bv at lea.-t one person and al^o acknowledged.
For acknowledgment by mark, UM legular Kansas acknowledgment.

1TATK OF
OUNTY OF_

"> >-. ACKNOWLEDGMENT FOR INDIVIDUAL (K.nnv, Okla.. and Colo.)

Before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public, within and for «.unl county and xtutc. on thi*_
»y of——
1 .——. V.*
personally appeared
nd__
a me personally known to be the identical person
1ttt

who executed the within and foregoing instrument xnd acknowledged to mc

fre
nc~wTT V v«gSXwffvp yrty *["£ ^JL'Z
;
V an^ v o , 1 u n ; a r >' n c l » n < * ^ l f«r the use- and purposes therein set forth.
UN \* IT*NK.SS W HKRKOF, I have hereunto set my hand and offu ial >eal the .lay and year !a-t al.o\e written.
ly mmmi.Hsinn expires
Nv..tai y Public.

